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PRINCIPLES OF INFLUENCE IN
NEGOTIATION
CHRIS GUTHRIE*

I. INTRODUCTION
Negotiation is often viewed as an alternative to adjudication.1 In fact,
however, negotiation and adjudication may be more alike than different
because each is a process of persuasion. Both in the courtroom and at the
bargaining table, the lawyer's primary task is to persuade someone other than
her own client that her client's positions, interests, and perspectives should be
honored.
Despite this apparent similarity, persuasion operates differently in
adjudication and negotiation because the lawyer seeks to influence a different
party in each process. In adjudication, the lawyer seeks primarily to persuade
the judge or jury hearing the case. 2 The judge or jury is empowered to resolve
the dispute unilaterally by applying rules of law to the relevant facts of the
case. In negotiation, the lawyer seeks to persuade not a judge or jury, but
rather her counterpart at the bargaining table.
One's counterpart in
negotiation is free to ignore the law and facts of the case but can only resolve
the dispute through bilateral agreement.
The import of these differences is that the lawyer must use different
persuasive tactics in each process. In court, the lawyer can use various
rhetorical and even dramatic devices to persuade the judge or jury to render a

* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. For helpful comments on a preliminary draft,
I thank Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Scott Hughes, Janice Nadler, and Nancy Welsh.
I. All of the leading "alternative dispute resolution" or "ADR" casebooks include sections
regarding negotiation along with such other processes as mediation and arbitration. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER
PROCESSES (4th ed. 2003); ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE
ROLE OF LAWYERS (3d ed. 2002); LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE

RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS (2d ed. 1987).
2. See, e.g., STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 15 (2d ed.

1997) ("A lawyer's goal at trial is to persuade the fact finder."). Often, the lawyer uses the litigation
process not only to persuade the judge or jury to rule in her favor but also to persuade her counterpart
to settle the case. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About
Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984) (coining the term "litigotiation"); Gary
Goodpaster, Lawsuits as Negotiations, 8 NEGOTIATION J. 221 (1992) (exploring the interplay

between litigation and negotiation).
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decision under the law that favors her client; 3 in negotiation, the lawyer needs
to use a more subtle set of devices to induce her counterpart to agree to enter
into a favorable settlement.
Psychologist Robert Cialdini has identified six persuasive devices or
"weapons of influence ' 4 that a lawyer can use to induce her counterpart to
settle on terms that are advantageous to her client. The purpose of this essay
is to introduce Cialdini's principles of influence, explore how they operate,
and explain how the lawyer-negotiator may be able to use them at the
bargaining table.
II. PRINCIPLES OF INFLUENCE
In a seminal article published in Science, Amos Tversky and Daniel

Kahneman introduced "heuristics and biases" into the psychology literature.6
Tversky and Kahneman defined heuristics as mental shortcuts that individuals
employ automatically to make judgments and decisions. 7 These heuristics are
"economical and usually effective," but they can also lead to "biases" or
"systematic and predictable errors." 8
Cialdini's principles of influence operate like these heuristics and biases
(though they are "motivational" rather than "cognitive" in origin). When
deciding whether to comply with a request, individuals generally look for
simple cues-like whether the requester is an authority figure-to help them
decide how to respond. Often, it is sensible for people to behave this way;
other times, however, it can
induce a "distinct kind of automatic, mindless
9
people."
from
compliance
Cialdini's principles of influence-liking, social proof, commitment and
consistency, reciprocity, authority, and scarcity-are quite powerful. A
lawyer who recognizes that her counterpart is likely to be influenced by these
principles may be able to employ them to her client's advantage at the
bargaining table. Each principle can be used to persuade, or as Cialdini puts
it, each "can be used like a weapon (of influence) to stimulate people to agree

3. See, e.g., LUBET, supra note 2, at 15 (devoting a chapter to "lawyer's tools" which "may be
employed to clarify, underscore, and emphasize your presentations at trial").
4. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE, at ix (4th ed. 2001).
5. Although this essay focuses primarily on the ways that lawyer-negotiators can use these
principles of influence to persuade their counterparts to settle, the principles are equally applicable to
non-lawyer-negotiators.
6. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974).

7. Id.
8. Id. at 1131.
9. CIALDINI, supra note 4, at x.
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to requests."'
Even those lawyers who would prefer not to employ these
techniques will benefit from understanding what they are and how they might
be used by their counterparts in negotiation.
A. Liking
The first principle of influence that a lawyer might use to her client's
advantage is the "liking" rule. According to this principle, individuals prefer
to comply with requests made by those they know and like. " Individuals tend
to like those who are physically attractive,' 2 those with whom
they share
14
3
something in common, and those with whom they are familiar.
Not all lawyers will be physically attractive to their counterparts, of
course, but every lawyer shares something in common with her counterpartat a bare minimum, both are members of the same profession. Thus, every
lawyer can attempt to capitalize on this similarity at the beginning of the
negotiation to try to develop a rapport with her counterpart. In one recent
study, Janice Nadler found that law students previously unknown to one
another who spent a few minutes chatting on the telephone prior to engaging
in an email negotiation obtained better outcomes than did those who did not
have a prenegotiation conversation. 15 Similarly, Jason Johnston and Joel
Waldfogel found that lawyers who litigated against each other frequently
were
6
more likely than others to settle their cases and to do so more quickly.'
B. Social Proof
The second principle of influence that a lawyer might use to her client's
advantage is "social proof." According to this principle, individuals "view a
behavior as correct in a given situation to the degree that we see others

10. Id. at 17.
11. Id. at 144 ("[A]s a rule, we most prefer to say yes to the requests of people we know and
like.").
12. Id. at 148-50 (describing how physical attractiveness creates a kind of "halo effect").
13. Id. at 150-51. As one commentator stated:
We like people who are similar to us. This fact seems to hold true whether the similarity is
in the area of opinions, personality traits, background, or lifestyle. Consequently, those
who want us to like them so that we will comply with them can accomplish that purpose by
appearing similar to us in a wide variety of ways.
Id. (citation omitted).
14. Id. at 154 ("For the most part, we like things that are familiar to us.") (citation omitted).
15. See Janice Nadler, Legal Negotiation and Communication Technology: How Small Talk
can FacilitateE-Mail Dealmaking, HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming).
16. Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation? Evidence
from FederalCivil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (2002).
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performing it.' 17 For example, individuals are more likely to laugh when
watching situation comedies if the "sitcoms" are accompanied by "laugh
tracks."' 8 Individuals "use others' laughter"--even canned laughter-"to help
decide what is humorous."' 9
Social proof is most likely to prove persuasive when two conditions are
obtained.
First, social proof is more influential under conditions of
uncertainty. "In general, when we are unsure of ourselves, when the situation
is unclear or ambiguous, when uncertainty reigns, we are most likely to look
to and accept the actions of others as correct., 20 Second, social proof is more
influential when the observer perceives similarities between herself and the
party she is observing.
"The principle of social proof operates most
powerfully when we are observing the behavior of people just like us. It is the
conduct of such people that gives us the greatest insight into what constitutes
correct behavior for ourselves.'
Thus, social proof might work hand-in-hand with the liking rule to enable
one lawyer to persuade the other to behave in the desired manner. For
instance, a lawyer who has garnered her counterpart's affection at the outset
of the negotiation 22 might exhibit certain behaviors at the bargaining table
(e.g., she can attempt to frame the negotiation as a search for jointly desirable
outcomes) and thereby "model" that behavior for her counterpart. This, in
turn, may induce her counterpart to conduct herself in a similar manner.
Likewise, a lawyer might use evidence from similar cases (perhaps drawn
from publications containing verdict and settlement data) showing how
often-and perhaps even for what amounts-litigants in similar cases have
settled. By demonstrating that similarly situated others have settled, the
lawyer may be able to persuade her counterpart that settlement is appropriate
for her as well.
C. Commitment and Consistency
The third principle of influence that a lawyer might use to her client's
17. CIALDrNI, supra note 4, at 100 (emphasis omitted).
18. Id. at 99-101 (citing to Raymond G. C. Fuller & Alan Sheehy-Skeffington, Effects of Group
Laughter on Responses to Humorous Materials:A Replication andExtension, 35 PSYCHOL. REP. 531
(1974); Mary M. Smyth & Raymond G. C. Fuller, Effects of Group Laughter on Responses to
Humorous Materials, 30 PSYCHOL. REP. 132 (1972)). For a different interpretation of the operation
of laugh tracks, see Rob Walker, Making Us Laugh, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 28, 2003, at 28
(profiling the inventor of the laugh track and citing psychologist Robert Provine for the proposition
that laugh tracks influence us for neurological, not social or psychological, reasons).
19. CIALDINI, supra note 4, at 100.
20. Id. at 111 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 119 (citation omitted).
22. See supra Part II.A.

MARQUE7TE LA W REVIEW

[87:829

performing it.' 17 For example, individuals are more likely to laugh when
watching situation comedies if the "sitcoms" are accompanied by "laugh
tracks."' 8 Individuals "use others' laughter"--even canned laughter-"to help
decide what is humorous."' 9
Social proof is most likely to prove persuasive when two conditions are
obtained.
First, social proof is more influential under conditions of
uncertainty. "In general, when we are unsure of ourselves, when the situation
is unclear or ambiguous, when uncertainty reigns, we are most likely to look
to and accept the actions of others as correct., 20 Second, social proof is more
influential when the observer perceives similarities between herself and the
party she is observing.
"The principle of social proof operates most
powerfully when we are observing the behavior of people just like us. It is the
conduct of such people that gives us the greatest insight into what constitutes
correct behavior for ourselves.'
Thus, social proof might work hand-in-hand with the liking rule to enable
one lawyer to persuade the other to behave in the desired manner. For
instance, a lawyer who has garnered her counterpart's affection at the outset
of the negotiation 22 might exhibit certain behaviors at the bargaining table
(e.g., she can attempt to frame the negotiation as a search for jointly desirable
outcomes) and thereby "model" that behavior for her counterpart. This, in
turn, may induce her counterpart to conduct herself in a similar manner.
Likewise, a lawyer might use evidence from similar cases (perhaps drawn
from publications containing verdict and settlement data) showing how
often-and perhaps even for what amounts-litigants in similar cases have
settled. By demonstrating that similarly situated others have settled, the
lawyer may be able to persuade her counterpart that settlement is appropriate
for her as well.
C. Commitment and Consistency
The third principle of influence that a lawyer might use to her client's
17. CIALDrNI, supra note 4, at 100 (emphasis omitted).
18. Id. at 99-101 (citing to Raymond G. C. Fuller & Alan Sheehy-Skeffington, Effects of Group
Laughter on Responses to Humorous Materials:A Replication andExtension, 35 PSYCHOL. REP. 531
(1974); Mary M. Smyth & Raymond G. C. Fuller, Effects of Group Laughter on Responses to
Humorous Materials, 30 PSYCHOL. REP. 132 (1972)). For a different interpretation of the operation
of laugh tracks, see Rob Walker, Making Us Laugh, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 28, 2003, at 28
(profiling the inventor of the laugh track and citing psychologist Robert Provine for the proposition
that laugh tracks influence us for neurological, not social or psychological, reasons).
19. CIALDINI, supra note 4, at 100.
20. Id. at 111 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 119 (citation omitted).
22. See supra Part II.A.

2004]

INFLUENCE

advantage is the "commitment and consistency" principle. According to this
principle, "[o]nce we make a choice or take a stand, we will encounter
personal and 23interpersonal pressures to behave consistently with that
commitment.,
Consider, for example, the "drive carefully" study.24
Researchers
randomly assigned homeowners in a residential neighborhood to either a
control group or an experimental group.
A researcher, posing as a
"volunteer," asked the homeowners in both groups if they would allow the
volunteer to post a gigantic "Drive Carefully" billboard in their front yards.
Each homeowner viewed a photo of the billboard demonstrating that it was so
large it would almost completely obscure the view of the house from the
street.
The only difference between the two groups was that two weeks earlier
another "volunteer" had asked the homeowners in the experimental group to
display a three inch by three inch sign that read "Be a Safe Driver." The
subjects in the experimental group, who complied with this seemingly
innocuous request, were much more likely to agree to the gigantic billboards
in their front yards: seventy-six percent of those in the experimental group
versus a mere seventeen percent in the control group agreed to do so.
"Because they had innocently complied with a trivial safe-driving request a
couple of weeks before, those homeowners became remarkably willing to
comply with another such request that was massive in size., 25
Likewise, a lawyer may prosper by encouraging her counterpart to make
small commitments early in the negotiation process. Perhaps, for example,
she can persuade her counterpart to agree to a minor substantive term, such as
a confidentiality clause or a no-publicity clause.
By inducing one's
counterpart to make a small commitment like this, the lawyer may be able to
obtain much more substantial agreements later in the process. Her counterpart
may simply feel duty bound to comply due to her earlier compliance in the
process.
D. Reciprocity
The fourth principle of influence that a lawyer might use to her client's
advantage is the "reciprocity rule" or "reciprocity norm." According to this

23. CIALDINI, supra note 4, at 53 (emphasis omitted).
consistency, see generally LEON FESTINGER,

For more on commitment and

A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE

(1957)

(introducing his theory of cognitive dissonance).
24. See Jonathan L. Freedman & Scott C. Fraser, Compliance Without Pressure: The Foot-inthe-Door Technique, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 195, 199-201 (1966).
25. CIALDINI, supra note 4, at 65.
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rule or norm, one "should try to repay, in kind, what another person has
27

provided us.

26

Because reciprocity appears to be a universal norm,

examples of it abound. Consider the following amusing example reported by
Cialdini:
Several years ago, a university professor tried a little experiment. He
sent Christmas cards to a sample of perfect strangers. Although he
expected some reaction, the response he received was amazingholiday cards addressed to him came pouring back from people who
had never met nor heard of him. The great majority of those who
returned cards never inquired into the identity of the unknown
professor. They received his holiday Areeting card, click, and whirr,
they automatically sent cards in return.
A lawyer can use the reciprocity rule in two ways to persuade her
counterpart to make a meaningful concession at the bargaining table. First,
and most obviously, she can make a concession herself, and this can create in
her counterpart a sense of obligation to respond similarly.29 If she started
from a more favorable position than her counterpart, the reciprocal concession
she induces her counterpart to make is likely to work to her client's advantage
in a distributive negotiation.
Second, and more subtly, a lawyer can request a substantial concession,
get turned down, and then make a more modest request. In many instances,
the lawyer's counterpart will feel obligated to respond to this ostensible
concession. Cialdini calls this the "rejection-then-retreat" strategy and
explains it as follows:
Suppose you want me to agree to a certain request. One way to
increase the chances that I will comply is first to make a larger request
of me, one that I will most likely turn down. Then, after I have
refused, you make the smaller request that you were really interested

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.

Id.
Id.(citing to a 1976 study reported by Kunz & Woolcott).
See, e.g., Paul W. Paese et al., Caught Telling the Truth: Effects of Honesty and

Communication

Media

in

Distributive

Negotiations,

at

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol 3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=305146 (showing that honest disclosures up front
can induce the other party to make lower demands). Note, however, that there is some evidence
suggesting that the concessions one makes may be devalued by the recipient due to loss aversion, see
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 54 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995); or reactive devaluation, see Lee
Ross & Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 389 (1991).
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in all along. Provided that you structured your requests skillfully, I
should view your second request as a concession to me and should
feel inclined to respond with
a concession of my own-compliance
30
with your second request.

E. Authority

The fifth principle of influence that a lawyer might use to her client's
advantage is "authority." According to this principle, individuals feel an
obligation to comply with those who are in real or perceived authority
positions. The most powerful, and troubling, illustration of the power of
authority comes from Stanley Milgram's obedience experiments, 3' in which
participants inflicted (what they thought were) dangerous electric shocks on
coparticipants simply because an authority figure (i.e., the experimenter) told
them to do so.
The authority principle dictates that individuals often defer to people in
positions of apparent authority-leaders, state officials, experimenters in lab
coats, and the like. Thus, a lawyer may try to invoke the judge as an authority
figure and make arguments about what the judge would do in the case to
persuade her counterpart to settle. In addition, although the authority
principle is generally understood to apply to human authorities, it could
extend to nonhuman authority, like the law or legal precedent. Thus, even
though lawyers in a settlement negotiation are generally free to disregard
applicable legal rules, a lawyer who appreciates the unique persuasive impact
of legal precedent as authority may wish to invoke it to persuade her
counterpart of the merits of some position.
F. Scarcity

The sixth principle of influence a lawyer might use to her client's
advantage is "scarcity." According to this principle, "opportunities seem
more valuable to us when they are less available. 32 Scarcity induces
compliance in large part because it threatens our 3 freedom
of choice ("if I do
3
not act now, I will lose the opportunity to do So").
30. CIALDTNI, supra note 4, at 38.

31. For the original study, see Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 371 (1963).
TO AUTHORITY (1974).

For an overview, see STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE

32. CIALDINI, supra note 4, at 205 (emphasis omitted).
33. We tend to bristle at such restrictions on our freedom due to a phenomenon called
"reactance." See generally JACK W. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE (1966);
S. SHARON BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM
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The lawyer who appreciates the impact scarcity is likely to have on her
counterpart may try to create the impression in negotiation that opportunities
to settle are limited and time is running out. For example, she might extend
an offer but give her counterpart a limited window within which to accept it.
Likewise, she might make an offer immediately prior to an expected judicial
ruling that might be harmful to her counterpart's case, or she might make an
offer of judgment under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
each instance, her counterpart might feel more motivated to settle due to the
34
scarcity principle.
III. CONCLUSION
Advertisers, marketers, and salespeople use Cialdini's principles of
influence to induce consumers to purchase their products. Likewise, a lawyer
can use these principles of influence to induce her counterpart in negotiation
to settle on terms that are favorable to her client. Simply because a lawyer
can use these principles, however, does not necessarily mean she should. A
lawyer should try to obtain the best possible outcome for her client, but she
should do so in ways that comport not only with the formal ethical rules, but
also with her own sense of professional responsibility 35 and personal ethics.
(Would I want my mother to know I used that tactic? Would I want my
counterpart to use that tactic? How would I feel if the local newspaper ran a
story about the negotiation?)
Most lawyers will feel comfortable employing Cialdini's principles of
influence; indeed, many lawyers already use these principles, even if they do
not apply Cialdini's labels to them. Like other negotiation tactics, these
principles often prove effective and do not run afoul of any formal ethical
rules. Other lawyers, however, might feel uncomfortable using at least some
of the principles.
For example, a lawyer who attempts to garner her
counterpart's affection solely to facilitate agreement, 36 or who attempts to
secure a small commitment from her counterpart solely as a way of obtaining
a larger one later, 37 might feel as though she is treating her counterpart "as a
mere means towards one's ends" and ignoring "general ethical requirements

AND CONTROL (1981).

34. Additionally, her counterpart might be influenced by regret aversion. See Chris Guthrie,
Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory ofLitigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
43.
35. For a progressive formulation, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in
Non-AdversarialLawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153 (1999).
36. See supraPart II.A.
37. See supraPart II.C.

MARQUETTE LA W RE VIE W

[87:829

The lawyer who appreciates the impact scarcity is likely to have on her
counterpart may try to create the impression in negotiation that opportunities
to settle are limited and time is running out. For example, she might extend
an offer but give her counterpart a limited window within which to accept it.
Likewise, she might make an offer immediately prior to an expected judicial
ruling that might be harmful to her counterpart's case, or she might make an
offer of judgment under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
each instance, her counterpart might feel more motivated to settle due to the
34
scarcity principle.
III. CONCLUSION
Advertisers, marketers, and salespeople use Cialdini's principles of
influence to induce consumers to purchase their products. Likewise, a lawyer
can use these principles of influence to induce her counterpart in negotiation
to settle on terms that are favorable to her client. Simply because a lawyer
can use these principles, however, does not necessarily mean she should. A
lawyer should try to obtain the best possible outcome for her client, but she
should do so in ways that comport not only with the formal ethical rules, but
also with her own sense of professional responsibility 35 and personal ethics.
(Would I want my mother to know I used that tactic? Would I want my
counterpart to use that tactic? How would I feel if the local newspaper ran a
story about the negotiation?)
Most lawyers will feel comfortable employing Cialdini's principles of
influence; indeed, many lawyers already use these principles, even if they do
not apply Cialdini's labels to them. Like other negotiation tactics, these
principles often prove effective and do not run afoul of any formal ethical
rules. Other lawyers, however, might feel uncomfortable using at least some
of the principles.
For example, a lawyer who attempts to garner her
counterpart's affection solely to facilitate agreement, 36 or who attempts to
secure a small commitment from her counterpart solely as a way of obtaining
a larger one later, 37 might feel as though she is treating her counterpart "as a
mere means towards one's ends" and ignoring "general ethical requirements

AND CONTROL (1981).

34. Additionally, her counterpart might be influenced by regret aversion. See Chris Guthrie,
Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory ofLitigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
43.
35. For a progressive formulation, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in
Non-AdversarialLawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153 (1999).
36. See supraPart II.A.
37. See supraPart II.C.

2004]

INFLUENCE

for treating people. 3 8 The lawyer, as a professional, must decide for herself
whether, and, if so, how to employ these powerful persuasive devices at the
bargaining table.

38. Jonathan R. Cohen, When People are the Means: Negotiating with Respect, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 739, 743 (2001) (emphasis omitted). Some lawyers might even avoid using these
principles-like the authority principle-on the grounds that they might systematically disadvantage
members of less powerful groups in society, like members of ethnic minorities, women, and gays and
lesbians.
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